We consider the decisions of a married couple in a risky environment. The distribution of spouses' bargaining power may change as a consequence of new outside opportunities that are o¤ered to them, so that individual consumption may ‡uctuate over time. This is what we call "bargaining risk". To reduce this risk, the spouses may decide to over-invest in marriage-speci…c capital (which, by de…nition, is completely lost in the case of divorce) and thereby limit the attractiveness of spouses'outside opportunities. This strategy is shown to be optimal. More suprisingly, over-investment in marriagespeci…c capital is still an optimal strategy when spouses are confronted to a (small) risk of divorce. This contrasts with the usual intuition.
Introduction
In married couples, some investments are speci…c to the relationship in the sense that they are much less valuable for spouses if marriage dissolves. Hence these investments increase the gains to both individuals of continuing the relationship and play an important role to explain the duration of marriage (Becker, 1974 (Becker, , 1991  Ben-Porath, 1980; Pollak, 1985) . For instance, Becker, Landes, and Michael (1977) point out that children enhance the value of the relationship and may decrease the chance that the relationship ends. 1 Conversely, the possibility of dissolution also discourages the accumulation of marriage-speci…c goods (Landes, 1978; Johnson and Skinner, 1986; Peters, 1986; Lommerud, 1988; Lundberg and Rose, 1999; Stevenson, 2007 ). 2 Our claim in the present paper is that, in a uncertainty context with risk-averse spouses, the decision process of the household may lead to over-investment in marriage-speci…c capital (de…ned as a larger level of investment than the optimal level observed when consumption pro…le is determined by binding contract at the beginning of the planning horizon). Investment may even be encouraged after a small, exogenous increase in the risk of divorce. To obtain this counterintuitive result, we construct a two-period model of household behavior, in which the decision process is described as a Rubinstein-Binmore bargaining game, and we suppose that spouses make decisions about the consumption of a private good and the consumption of a public good. The public good is durable (over two periods) and 1 This issue is addressed by several studies in sociology (Huber and Spitze, 1980; Waite and Lillard, 1991; Brüderl and Kalter, 2001 , for instance). 2 The possibility of underinvestment in the context of the …rm is well documented in the holdup literature. The intuition dates back to Williamson (1975) and Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) ; it was formalized by Grout (1984) ; for these models, see the surveys by Hart and Holmstrom (1988) and Malcomson (1997) . Crawford (1988 Crawford ( , 1990 and Tirole (1986) show that overinvestment may sometimes arise from the multiplicity of equilibriums. Rotemberg and Saloner (1987) and Mutthoo (1998) present some particular situations where overinvestment is the rule. The problem of the couple di¤ers from the traditional holdup problem because (i) the decision of investment in marriage-speci…c capital is jointly made by both spouses, (ii) divorce is the result of exogenous shocks that a¤ect the surplus of marriage. Underinvestment is, however, supposed to be the rule as underlined by the papers cited above. speci…c to the relationship, that is, its value decreases in the case of divorce. We then suppose that, in general, a couple is not able to credibly commit to a fair division of future consumption since any current agreement can be renegotiated. 3 The future …nancial situation of spouses, which will in ‡uence the intra-household balance of power, cannot be predicted at the moment of the marriage. If the state of nature turns to be markedly favorable to the husband (say), the latter can be inclined to take advantage of the situation and renege on the agreement made with his wife. The ‡uctuations in consumption which result from variations in spouses'
bargaining power is what we call "bargaining risk" hereafter. This form of risk may persist even if, at the end, divorce never takes place.
We consider two versions of the model. In the …rst version, the possibility of divorce is excluded. The spouses' relationship continues because the surplus from marriage generated by the marriage-speci…c good is positive and constant during the two periods. Even in that case, however, the bargaining risk tends to decrease intertemporal utility of individuals living in multi-person households (so far as they are averse to risk, of course). An informal system of insurance then consists in investing more in marriage-speci…c capital, which will indeed reduce the attractiveness of spouses' outside opportunities, so that the ‡uctuations in bargaining power will be reduced as well. We prove that this strategy is optimal. The corollary is that the variance of individual consumption is less important in high-income households than in low-income households. In the second version of the model, the possibility of divorce is included. In the course of the marriage, new informations are received by spouses that modify their subjective evaluation of the surplus from marriage. A large, negative shock on the marriage surplus may, ultimately, lead spouses to the dissolution of the couple (which entails the complete loss of the investment in marriage-speci…c capital). We then show, quite surprisingly, that overinvestment in marriage-speci…c capital may even be larger in this version of the model -at least when the risk of divorce remains moderate -than in the …rst version. This result is explained by the fact that investment in marriage-speci…c capital is more pro…table in terms of reduction of the bargaining risk when spouses 3 The consequences of the non-existence of enforceable intertemporal contracts for couples are examined in many models (Konrad and Lommerud, 2000; Lundberg, 2002; Rainer, 2007; Wells and Maher, 1998) . In these models, under-investment in marriage-speci…c capital is the rule.
are facing small, negative shocks that does not necessarily lead to divorce. 4 The paper is structured as follows. The main assumptions on preferences, the form of uncertainty and the decision process are presented in section 2. Over-investment in marriage-speci…c capital in a non-divorce model is discussed in section 3. The results are generalized to a divorce context in section 4. The last section concludes.
2 The Model of the Household
Goods, Preferences and Uncertainty
In this section, we shall present the main assumptions of the model. We …rst describe the utility functions and then introduce uncertainty.
To …x ideas and simplify notation, we consider a two-person household in a twoperiod setting. During the …rst period, the spouses make decisions about the optimal levels of consumption of a private good and a public good. During the second period, the spouses spend their resources on the sole private good. The public good has two features: (i) its consumption can be made during two periods, i.e., the good is durable, (ii) its consumption is speci…c to the marriage, i.e., the good is totally lost in the case of divorce. 5 This good can typically be interpreted as a non-divisible marketable capital good (such as the spouses'house at least if transaction costs are large) or a non-divisible non-marketable capital good (such as children or love). Let x it denote the individual consumption of the private good of spouse i (i = 1; 2) at period t (t = 1; 2), and X the consumption of the public good (i.e., the marriage-speci…c capital). 4 It is obvious that the results that follows can be used to describe any form of partnership, for instance, a small group of highly-specialized workers or a duopole, as far as (i) investments in relationship-speci…c capital is involved and (ii) opportunistic behavior cannot be prevented. 5 The public good can alternatively be seen as produced with a linear technology using money input. Lommerud (1989) and Lundberg (2002) , for example, suppose that the public good is produced from a technology using spouses'time inputs. The spouses'time devoted to domestic chores in the …rst period enhances the productivity in the second period. In that case, the increase in household productivity is largely speci…c to the relationship because the public good is less valuable in case of divorce.
The spouses are characterized by identical, intertemporally additive utility functions, and the discount factor of the second period is equal to one (i.e., there is no time impatience). Our argument would be more complicated but not signi…cantly altered if spouses'preferences were di¤erent. 6 We thus suppose the following.
Assumption A1. The utility functions at each period are of the Von-NeumanMorgenstern form with an additive structure, that is,
where v ( ) is a two times di¤erentiable function that satis…es
and u ( ) is a three times di¤erentiable function that satis…es
Because of the sign of the derivatives, the spouses can be said to be risk-averse and prudent. 7 In the remainder of this paper, we shall consider additional restrictions on these utility functions.
The household as a whole receives an exogenous income, denoted by Y t , at each period t. The amount of these incomes is non-stochastic and completely determined at the beginning of the …rst period. If the price of all the goods is set to one, the budget constraint of the …rst period is thus equal to x 11 + x 21 + X = Y 1 ; and the budget constraint of the second period is equal to x 12 + x 22 = Y 2 . The household income of the second period can be broken down into individual incomes, that is, Y 2 = y 1 + y 2 , where y i is the exogenous personal income of spouse i. The distribution of the individual incomes between spouses is stochastic and such that
where " is a random term which follows a symmetric distribution with support . This form of risk is purely idiosyncratic and can be eliminated by an e¢ cient system of insurance between spouses. The fact that there does not exist marital contracts legally enforceable is exactly at the core of this paper.
To guarantee that solutions are interior, we shall assume the following.
Assumption A2. The utility functions and the household income are such that, at the equilibrium, the optimal level of investment in marriage speci…c capital is positive.
The Sharing of Private Consumption
In this subsection, we shall examine how the spouses divide private consumption between them conditionally on the decisions they made about the investment in marriage-speci…c capital.
The private consumption is shared between spouses according to some rule that depends on the household environment. Since the environment that we consider is initially symmetrical (same utility functions and same anticipations for both spouses), it is natural to suppose that the …rst period household income is equally divided between spouses. The level of utility obtained by each spouse in the …rst period is then given by
This assumption, if plausible, requires that, at the moment of the marriage, the partners have approximately the same outside opportunities.
The speci…cation of the sharing of the second period household income is more complicated. The sharing rule will generally be a function of the respective individual incomes that spouses observe at the end of the …rst period. The main idea of our approach is inspired by the bargaining models à la Rubinstein-Binmore 8 where outside opportunities are given here by the level of utility obtained in the case of divorce. 9 In other words, the distribution of consumption is subject to the constraint that the spouses obtain at least the level of utility of divorce. If they decide to divorce, the spouses give up the marriage surplus. The level of utility of each spouse is then equal to u (y i ). The dissolution of the couple is necessarily ine¢ cient because of the loss of the marriage surplus. Therefore, the spouses can always bargain and redistribute the gains of marriage in such a way that divorce never occurs. 10 The participation constraints involve that spouses receive in
marriage at least what they would obtain in divorce. We consider two regimes.
(i) If both participation constraints are not binding, the second period household income will be divided in equal shares, and the level of utility of each spouse at the second period will simply be equal to
(ii) If the participation constraint of spouse i is binding, she will obtain the reservation level of utility obtained from divorce, that is,
and spouse j will obtain a level of utility inferior to that given by equation (4) which will be precisely de…ned hereafter.
The participation constraint of spouse i will be binding if the realized value of the individual income y i is above a reservation value y implicitly de…ned by
The reservation value is thus the level of individual income for which spouse i is indi¤erent between remaining married (with an equal sharing of the second-period income) and divorcing. This value is the same for both spouses because of the symmetry of the framework. Hence the solution to equation (5) can be denoted as: y = y (Y 2 ; X). This function is always greater than or equal to Y 2 =2 because v(X) 0; it increases when X increases.
The spouse i will be in position of demanding a greater share of private consumption if the individual income she or he receives at the second period is greater than the reservation value y de…ned above. The function i represents thus the smallest transfer received by spouse i such that she accepts to remain in the marriage. It is formally de…ned by
so that the level of utility is the same when she lives with her partner, bene…ting from the marriage-speci…c capital, and when she lives as single. This equation has a unique solution for any y i y which is denoted by
This function can be shown to be everywhere comprised between Y 2 =2 and y i and satisfy:
That is, an increase in the level of marriage-speci…c capital and a decrease in individual income have a negative impact on what can be demanded by the spouse with a credible opportunity of leaving. It can also be formally proved using the implicit function theorem that @ 2 =@y 2 i < 0 and @ 2 =@X 2 > 0. Moreover, the following identity must always be satis…ed:
Finally, if the participation constraint of spouse i is binding, the partner of spouse
i will obtain what is left, Y 2 (y i ; X), that is, the total resources from which the share of total consumption of spouse i is substracted.
Remark. In the model, the equal sharing of total income is the rule as long as y i remains below its reservation value y . The property of income pooling -according to which only the sum of spouses'individual incomes, and not its distribution 
The Full-Commitment Model
To make a comparison, we …rst consider the case where the spouses are able to commit to an allocation of resources for the future. In other words, idiosyncratic risks are completely eliminated by e¢ cient risk sharing. 11 In that case, the level of consumption assured to both spouses in the second period -whatever the initial distribution of individual incomes may be -will be equal to Y 2 =2. The choice of the intertemporal allocation of resources is simply determined by the following optimization problem:
The …rst order condition for an interior solution can be written as:
The solution to this equation is denoted by X 1 . The full-commitment model and its optimal solution X 1 will be used as a benchmark. 12 3 Investment in Marriage-Speci…c Capital and Bargaining Risk
The Expected Utility
In this section, we shall suppose that the spouses are not able to make binding contracts and then examine the household equilibrium. First, the participation constraints are binding if and only if the individual income of one spouse is above the reservation value, that is,
from equation (2) . The density distribution function of " is symmetric and denoted by ("), the support of which is [
]. The (conditional) expected utility function of each spouse at the second period is obtained by integrating " over its domain. The expected utility function for spouse i (say) can be expressed, using a convenient change of variable, as follows:
where, to keep notation as simple as possible, only the …rst argument of the sharing rule is made explicit and
12 The full-commitment model is also valid if the dispersion of the individual incomes is so limited that the threat of divorce is never credible.
The …rst integral on the right-hand side represents the contribution to the expected utility when the two participation constraints are non-binding; the second integral represents the contribution when the participation constraint of one spouse is binding.
The Variance of Individual Consumption
Before computing the spouses'marginal expected utility for the second period, we shall compute the variance of individual consumptions which will be used hereafter. If we now use the fact that the expected individual consumption for each spouse is equal to E(x i ) = Y 2 =2 because of the symmetry of the optimization problem, and compute the variance of the individual consumption for each spouse, we obtain (with a convenient change of variable): can be used as a system of insurance against adverse economic events. If we now di¤erentiate this expression with respect to X, use the Leibniz Rule and equation (7), we obtain:
The derivative of the variance of individual consumption with respect to the level of marriage-speci…c capital is negative since @ =@X < 0. The intuition is that investment makes spouses' outside opportunities less attractive and reduces the variance of individual private consumption.
The Marginal Expected Utility
In this subsection, we shall compute the marginal utility of investment in marriagespeci…c capital.
As shown in the appendix A, if we di¤erentiate expression (10) with respect to X, we obtain a decomposition of the marginal utility of marriage-speci…c capital as follows,
The …rst term on the right-hand-side simply represents the consumption motive of marriage-speci…c capital. This term is equal to
The second term represents the insurance motive of marriage-speci…c capital. We can write it as:
where the remainder is a fourth order term. The insurance motive is strictly positive if y < (Y 2 + )=2 at the equilibrium. Everything else being equal, if the level of marriage-speci…c capital increases, the share of consumption that the spouse with a credible threat of divorce can demand will be reduced. This e¤ect is proportionate to a measure of the concavity of the utility function and to the e¤ect of marriagespeci…c capital on the dispersion of consumption.
The Partial Commitment Model
Given that marital contracts are generally not enforceable through the legal system, the partial-commitment set-up we examine now is certainly more credible than the full-commitment case discussed above. The spouses choose the level of marriage-speci…c capital in order to maximize their expected utility. The optimization problem of each spouse is then as follows:
Using expressions (13) and (14), and applying simple transformations, the …rst order condition for an interior solution is given by:
The solutions to this equation is denoted by X 2 . The …rst order condition here can now be compared with the …rst order condition obtained in the full commitment case, which directly gives the following result. Proof. This result is immediate from the comparison of …rst order conditions (9) and (16) The intuition is elementary. Confronted to bargaining risk, the risk-averse spouses will overinvest in marriage-speci…c capital to reduce the ‡uctuations in future individual consumption. The condition used in the proposition implies that the participation conditions will be binding for some values of individual incomes.
Income and the Variance of Individual Consumption
In this subsection, we shall examine how the decisions of investment in marriagespeci…c capital are a¤ected by variations in the …rst period income of the household.
The result is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 2. Assume A1-A2 and assume that (Y 2 + )=2 > y (Y 2 ; X 2 ). Then the level of investment in marriage-speci…c capital increases when the …rst period income increases.
Proof. If we di¤erentiate the …rst order condition (16) with respect to Y 1 , we obtain:
It is shown in the appendix B that @I=@X < 0. Hence, the term in squared brackets is negative and @X=@Y 1 > 0.
The e¤ect of the second period income on the level of investment in marriagespeci…c capital is generally ambiguous. The above proposition has an important corollary that characterizes the intra-household distribution of consumption at the second period. Proof. From proposition 2, an increase in the …rst period income has a positive impact on the level of marriage-speci…c capital. From equation (11), then, the variance of individual consumptions decreases.
This result implies, all other things being the same, that the distribution of individual consumption, primarily for older couples (once …rst period investments are made), will tend to be more egalitarian, or at least more stable, in high-income households than in low-income households. What is relevant here is the income of the beginning of spouses'life-cycle because it determines the initial level of invest-
ments. An increase in income that is unanticipated by spouses should not in ‡uence the variance of consumption at the end of the life-cycle. One interpretation is that intra-household equality is a normal good, the consumption of which increases with the household income. With a completely di¤erent model, Haddad and Kanbur (1992) and Kanbur and Haddad (1994) obtain a similar result and conclude that economic development should ultimately lead to a decrease in intrahousehold inequality. The same conclusion can be drawn here.
Investment in Marriage-Speci…c Capital and Divorce Risk
The conclusions derived above can radically change, in principle, if the spouses run the risk of divorce. In this section, we shall incorporate this risk and examine how the household equilibrium is modi…ed.
The Risk of Divorce
The traditional view says that the possibility of family dissolution has a disincentive e¤ect on the accumulation of marriage-speci…c capital because such capital is less valuable after dissolution. To go into this issue, we shall investigate what happens to the main results we derived in the preceding section when the spouses may decide to separate at the end of the …rst period.
To begin with, let us note that the sole hypotheses placed on the distribution of individual incomes are not su¢ cient to generate a positive probability of disso- is perturbed by a random term which represents new information, that is,
if the couple remains married if the couple divorces :
where U 2 (X) has the same de…nition as in the preceding section, V 2 (X; ) is the level of utility after the new information is revealed to spouses, is a random term and > 0 is a constant that can be interpreted as an exogenous tendency to divorce. The density distribution function of is symmetric and denoted by '( ), the support of which is [ This assumption is not harmless since it implies that the shock on marriage and the marriage-capital are perfect substitute. Indeed, the marriage dissolution is the optimal solution (D = 1) if the random term is such that the marriage surplus of the second period is completely swallowed up, that is,
Otherwise, the resulting decrease in utility due to is completely equivalent to an unanticipated variation in the level of marriage-speci…c good at the second period. In particular, the loss in utility due to the negative shock vanishes if spouses divorce. Thus, the probability of divorce is a function of X given by
Using the law of iterated expectations, the (conditional) expected utility of each spouse is given by
is the conditional expected utility given that the couple does not divorce, and
is the conditional expected utility given that the couple divorces. Note that, in this latter case,
that is, the utility of spouses coincides with the utility they would obtain in an intact family with the level of the marriage-speci…c good equal to zero (since, in that case, i = y i ).
The Full-Commitment Model with Divorce
As a point of comparison, let us consider again the case where spouses are able to commit to the allocation of future resources. Note that, in spite of the existence of binding agreements, divorce is still the optimal strategy for spouses if < 2X= . Even in the case of the couple's dissolution, however, the level of private consumption assured to both spouses in the second period must remain constant and equal to Y 2 =2. The idea is that spouses make a contract with spousal support in the case of divorce such that the level of consumption is una¤ected. The choice of the intertemporal allocation of resources is simply determined by the following optimization problem:
where
is the averaged shock conditional on the continuation of the marriage. The …rst order condition for an interior solution can be written as:
Noting that v 0 (X) = 1 here, the right-hand side of this expression is inferior to that of expression (9) . Hence the optimal level of marriage-speci…c capital in the present model will be necessarily below the full commitment level in the no divorce model. This is exactly the explanation for underinvestment in marriage-speci…c capital given by Gary Becker and others for a model without uncertainty. The optimal level of marriage-speci…c capital is denoted by X 3 . Quite interestingly, the strategy that consists for individuals in accumulating marriage-speci…c capital to reduce the risk of divorce is not appropriate here. Indeed, for individuals who are just about to divorce and whose the decision might be a¤ected by the level of marriage-speci…c capital, the marginal utility obtained from continuing the relationship is exactly the same as that of divorcing. They have thus no incitation to accumulate marriage-speci…c capital. The mechanism that support overinvestment described below is thus di¤erent.
The Marginal Expected Utility
In this subsection, we compute the marginal utility of investment in marriagespeci…c capital. Using identity (18) , and applying the Leibniz rule, we can show that the derivative of equation (17) with respect to X can be written as:
because of assumption 3, and
and the terms C( ) and I( ) are de…ned in the preceding section. The marginal expected utility is thus equal to the consumption and insurance motives of investment in marriage-speci…c capital averaged over all the state of the nature, accounting for the fact that these motives are equal to zero if divorce is involved.
The Optimal Level of Marriage-Speci…c Capital
The optimal level of marriage-speci…c capital in the bargaining model with divorce is denoted by X 4 . The optimization problem of each spouse can be written as:
Using the expression previously derived, and applying some simple transformations, the …rst order condition for an interior solution is given by:
To obtain the next result we need to suppose the following.
Assumption A4. The Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion of spouses is decreasing, that is,
This condition is generally supposed to be plausible and it is satis…ed, for instance, by the CRRA utility function. Furthermore, this condition is su¢ cient, but not necessary, to obtain the result that follows. This result states that, for some values of that are relatively small, the optimal level of marriage-speci…c capital will be larger in the divorce case than in the non-divorce case. 
(b) For any > , an increase in has a negative impact on the level of marriage-speci…c capital, and
where X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 are the optimal levels of investment in marriage-speci…c capital in the full-commitment case, in the partial-commitment case, in the fullcommitment case with divorce, and in the partial-commitment case with divorce.
Proof. If we di¤erentiate the …rst order condition (22) with respect to , we obtain:
The sign of the derivative of the optimal level of marriage-speci…c capital with respect to will be the same as the sign of the term in brackets on the right-hand side of this expression.
Part (a). The optimal level of marriage-speci…c capital is strictly positive from assumption 2. Then, by de…nition of the limit, there exists a positive value 1 such that, for any < 1 and any , divorce is not optimal. Then, for any < 1 ,
From these expressions, we can compute the derivative of the right-hand side of expression (23) . First, we have:
Because of the symmetry of '( ), the derivative of I M can be written (using a convenient change of variable) as:
From the appendix B, we know that the insurance motive is decreasing and, if assumption 4 is satis…ed, convex in the level of marriage-speci…c capital. The term in brackets is thus positive. If we incorporate it in (23), we prove that, as long as < 1 , the level of investment in marriage-speci…c capital increases with .
Because of the budget constraint, the optimal value of the investment in marriagespeci…c capital is bounded. Hence there exists a value 2 such that X 4 = 2 =2. At this very point, the probability of divorcing becomes positive and
Since '( 1=2) = 0, the left-hand side of this expression is continuous at X 4 = 2 =2. Consequently, there exists a value > 2 such that the probability of divorce is positive and such that, for any < , an increase in has a positive impact on the level of marriage-speci…c capital. Then, using proposition 1, we prove that X 4 > X 2 > X 1 X 3 .
Part (b).
In the general case, the term in brackets on the right-hand side of expression (23) is equal to:
where the second term on the right-hand-side is always negative and the …rst term is negative if is su¢ ciently large. Hence, there exists some critical value such that, for any > , an increase in has a negative impact on the level of marriage-speci…c capital. When tends to in…nity, then X 4 converges to X 3 :
The second statement in this proposition is conformed to the intuition of Gary
Becker and his followers that the risk of divorce discourages investment in marriagespeci…c capital. One can see, though, that the complete story is more complicated:
an exogenous reduction in the tendency to divorce (represented by and due to a change in divorce laws, for instance) may also have a positive e¤ect on investment in marriage-speci…c capital. To make this result more explicit, the pro…le of the optimal level of investment in marriage-speci…c capital be broken down into two segments: for any value below , the optimal level of investment increases and, for any above , the optimal level of investment decreases. For intermediate values, the form of the pro…le is not determined. The intuition of the increasing segment is that the insurance e¤ect of investment in marriage-speci…c capital is reinforced when the marriage surplus is a¤ected by a small shock that may lead to divorce. The occurrence of negative shocks on the marriage-surplus makes investment in marriage-speci…c capital much more pro…table. The negative shocks are not completely counterweighted by positive shocks that have the opposite e¤ect.
Note, however, that the existence of the …rst increasing segment depends on our assumptions regarding the distribution of the random term and, in particular, the symmetry of the density distribution function '( ). However, the increasing segment would be even more marked if shocks exhibited negative skewness -which is not necessarily counter-intuitive.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new theoretical framework that can be used to in- Therefore, oversaving can be used as an alternative instrument to reduce bargaining risk. The decision process may …nally lead to underinvestment in marriage-speci…c capital. However, this conclusion does not fundamentally change our claim. Savings in this story have a marriage-speci…c component that make them attractive to reduce bargaining risk. Future empirical studies should investigate these issues and examine the implications of these results for the literature on collective models.
Appendix A. The Marginal Expected Utility: The
Consumption and Insurance Motives
Di¤erentiating the expected utility function with respect to X gives the marginal expected utility of marriage-speci…c capital. If the Leibniz rule and equation (7) are used, the marginal expected utility can be expressed as the sum of two terms:
The interpretation and the sign of both terms in equation (A-1) can be precisely determined.
The Consumption Motive.
The …rst term represents the consumption motive of the investment in the marriagespeci…c capital, that is,
The Insurance Motive.
The second term of equation (A-1) represents the insurance motive of the investment in the marriage-speci…c capital. De…ning h(t) = (t) Y 2 =2 and using a convenient change of variable, the insurance motive can be written as:
This expression is clearly positive since the utility function is concave and @ =@X is negative. If we calculate the second order Taylor approximation of u 0 around point Y 2 =2, and introduce this approximation in I, we obtain: The insurance motive is de…ned as:
where h (t) = (t) Y 2 =2.
The …rst derivative of this expression is The second derivative is equal to A(t) @ 3 (t) @X 3 + 3B(t)
where A(t) and B(t) are de…ned as above and This expression is negative if the measure of risk aversion is decreasing (as required by assumption 4). In that case,
